Targeting Capability First
From my Comment at BC:
We are in a struggle against terrorists, or more specifically, a collection of individuals bonded together by a conceptual paradigm, one that blends a radical Islamic ideology with the indiscriminate targeting of civilians.
A very significant characteristic of this paradigm is its inadaptibility; it has a built-in redundancy that disallows invalidation. When all pay-offs are in the next world, and when all events are determined, there is not much you can do to deter or forcefully modify the faith of the true believer when death (martyrdom) is embraced and celebrated. This is our opponent.
In strategy, the two most important things to consider are your opponent's intentions, and his capabilities. Now, what strategy should you choose when fighting an enemy that cannot be deterred, whose intentions are set and cannot be restrained?
Simply, you focus primarily on his capabilities. Unfortunately, we live in an age of force-multiplication via technological innovation, yet these multipliers still have costs and most have entry barriers to their manufacture. The creation of nuclear weapons is the best example, since the large infrastructure needed to manufacture this extreme multiplier demands vast resources that only a state can bring to bear.
But capabilities are restrained or multiplied in many ways that have nothing to do with weaponry. Freedom of movement, unadulterated time to plan, protection from interference...all of these can increase the capability of an organization. An cult like Al'Qaeda would have a precipitous drop in capability and power projection if they had none of these things.
Therefore, the most intelligent course of action would be to strike quickly at the nexus between your opponent and his access to force-multipliers, while also seeking to limit the places on the globe where quarter is offered. Hence our strategy to eliminate the places that posed both of these dangers: Iraq, Syria, and Iran. (I do not say North Korea because to my knowledge this country does not offer quarter; likewise, Saudi Arabia does not offer weapons, though they do offer money).
Iraq was the obvious choice after Al'Qaeda's base in Afghanistan was collapsed; in essence, it was the low-hanging fruit of the three problematic areas. 12 years of constant attrition of Iraqi military defences through no-fly-zone, 17 violated resolutions, our significant knowledge of the territory, the violation of the 1991 Armistice, the vast history of Saddam's repression and evil, the familiarity of the American public with Iraq's status as an enemy, the large quantities of unaccounted-for WMD, and the strategic placement of Iraq between the other two problem areas made it the obvious next step. Taking down Iraq and building a democracy offered an excellent opportunity to address the problems of Iran and Syria, too, in a non-military fashion. Iran's military was strong enough to be a deterrent, and the population restless enough, that it made sense to address it slowly and subtly. Syria, more than the other two, was vulnerable to pressure and political maneuvering. We have made great strides in these areas by going after Iraq.
But it all comes down to capability. There may not be much we can do against the ideology when British-born well-to-do Muslims decide their wives and Mercedes are unsatisfactory, when the hatred overwhelms reason and they lash out at the innocent. But a starting point would be to limit the amount of damage they can do when their eyes turn red.
The Nash equilibrium in Game theory is the best strategy for you to take given the constancy of your opponent's strategy. In a two-player zero sum game, it is called the Maximin Criterion. Focusing on Al'Qaeda's capability instead of focusing on deterrence was/is the Maximin Criterion and the simplest Nash equilibrium. If we are to take Al'Qaeda seriously, if we are to take their declaration of total war as a true exposition of their intention, and their strategy of terror as constant, OIF was by far the most responsible next step in this large and complicated war.
Without states that harbor and give quarter, without infrastructure to produce force-multipliers, and without the protection and organizational integrity that states can offer the terrorists, their capability will remain closely linked to the backback and the fertilizer.
We are in a struggle against terrorists, or more specifically, a collection of individuals bonded together by a conceptual paradigm, one that blends a radical Islamic ideology with the indiscriminate targeting of civilians.
A very significant characteristic of this paradigm is its inadaptibility; it has a built-in redundancy that disallows invalidation. When all pay-offs are in the next world, and when all events are determined, there is not much you can do to deter or forcefully modify the faith of the true believer when death (martyrdom) is embraced and celebrated. This is our opponent.
In strategy, the two most important things to consider are your opponent's intentions, and his capabilities. Now, what strategy should you choose when fighting an enemy that cannot be deterred, whose intentions are set and cannot be restrained?
Simply, you focus primarily on his capabilities. Unfortunately, we live in an age of force-multiplication via technological innovation, yet these multipliers still have costs and most have entry barriers to their manufacture. The creation of nuclear weapons is the best example, since the large infrastructure needed to manufacture this extreme multiplier demands vast resources that only a state can bring to bear.
But capabilities are restrained or multiplied in many ways that have nothing to do with weaponry. Freedom of movement, unadulterated time to plan, protection from interference...all of these can increase the capability of an organization. An cult like Al'Qaeda would have a precipitous drop in capability and power projection if they had none of these things.
Therefore, the most intelligent course of action would be to strike quickly at the nexus between your opponent and his access to force-multipliers, while also seeking to limit the places on the globe where quarter is offered. Hence our strategy to eliminate the places that posed both of these dangers: Iraq, Syria, and Iran. (I do not say North Korea because to my knowledge this country does not offer quarter; likewise, Saudi Arabia does not offer weapons, though they do offer money).
Iraq was the obvious choice after Al'Qaeda's base in Afghanistan was collapsed; in essence, it was the low-hanging fruit of the three problematic areas. 12 years of constant attrition of Iraqi military defences through no-fly-zone, 17 violated resolutions, our significant knowledge of the territory, the violation of the 1991 Armistice, the vast history of Saddam's repression and evil, the familiarity of the American public with Iraq's status as an enemy, the large quantities of unaccounted-for WMD, and the strategic placement of Iraq between the other two problem areas made it the obvious next step. Taking down Iraq and building a democracy offered an excellent opportunity to address the problems of Iran and Syria, too, in a non-military fashion. Iran's military was strong enough to be a deterrent, and the population restless enough, that it made sense to address it slowly and subtly. Syria, more than the other two, was vulnerable to pressure and political maneuvering. We have made great strides in these areas by going after Iraq.
But it all comes down to capability. There may not be much we can do against the ideology when British-born well-to-do Muslims decide their wives and Mercedes are unsatisfactory, when the hatred overwhelms reason and they lash out at the innocent. But a starting point would be to limit the amount of damage they can do when their eyes turn red.
The Nash equilibrium in Game theory is the best strategy for you to take given the constancy of your opponent's strategy. In a two-player zero sum game, it is called the Maximin Criterion. Focusing on Al'Qaeda's capability instead of focusing on deterrence was/is the Maximin Criterion and the simplest Nash equilibrium. If we are to take Al'Qaeda seriously, if we are to take their declaration of total war as a true exposition of their intention, and their strategy of terror as constant, OIF was by far the most responsible next step in this large and complicated war.
Without states that harbor and give quarter, without infrastructure to produce force-multipliers, and without the protection and organizational integrity that states can offer the terrorists, their capability will remain closely linked to the backback and the fertilizer.
posted by John Aristides at 12:20 PM
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