Response to Den Beste's media analysis
Steven Den Beste posts on Redstate.org an analysis of Al'Qaeda's inherent weaknesses in a propaganda campaign that depends on headlines, on the one hand, and the support of fellow travelers on the other. My response:
Your analysis is correct that headline fatigue and revulsion work against the Islamists in the majority, but Al'Qaeda is not necessarily playing to the majority. Zawahiri expressly states that the goal of the "propaganda by deed" is to reach a mere 5% of the Muslim youth. Comparing this objective to reality seems to indicate that Zawahiri is succeeding in what he and Osama set out to do.
Whether 5% is sufficient and whether propaganda by deed is a good strategy are valid questions and deserve a systematic inquiry. Nevertheless, one might concede your analysis of Al'Qaeda's informational weakness and still hold the opinion that they will not be determinative in Al'Qaeda's defeat.
The underlying problem, for which we have relatively few answers, is the increasing self-identification of young men according to their Muslimness, and the corollary universalization of grievances as Muslim grievances. This phenomenon is most prevalent in young Muslim men who have some level of interaction with the West (see Sayed Qutb's rejection of the West after his visit to America). This interaction heightens their awareness of global status (comparative failure), which then reinforces the jihadi imperative.
5%, linked and reinforced through the internet, is a formidable force. Al'Qaeda's influence overall may wax and wane with the media cycle, but the resolve of this group will not.
Which means the arm of decision is predominantly a Western arm. The danger is an admixture of Al'Qaeda's propaganda by deed with the feeling of Western guilt propagated by a cannabalistic media. Our narcissism is unusual in that, while we cannot pull ourselves away from the looking glass, it is a self-immolating fascination with abomination that keeps us rooted. Such self-disgust and guilt, which are reinforced by a media and academia that trade in it, are the only factors that can create the necessary environment for Western defeat. We may be periodically disturbed from our trance, through rioting or the occasional attack, and we may lash out in annoyance, but pulling ourselves away from our self-obsession for any length of time is now almost impossible. How long before the roots take hold permanently? How long before our guilt--and the timid intertia it causes--transitions into decline?
Islamist terror is but one manifestation of rejectionist ideology--the most obvious and most visible (and therefore the least problematic). The real danger comes from within. To withstand the viral assaults on our society that will inevitably come, we need to be bolstered by self-confidence and purpose. Unfortunately, these are the virtues that are slowly being stripped away by our elite.
The cause in fact of a potential decline will be our academia, but the proximate cause will be an irresponsible and undiscerning media. Therefore, the media is a clear and present danger and must be engaged.
[Den Beste responded that 5% is an impotent mass]
Your points are well taken: that 5% cannot succeed against a motivated 95%, and that headline fatigue causes a flight to the macabre which then attrits the support of the fellow-traveler--a support necessary for a robust terrorist movement.
We should then fear not the macabre, but acts of ostensible revolution couched in language sure to hypnotize a vast segment of the disaffected, Marxist Left (riots in France, perhaps?). Islamists might not be nimble enough to manage this, though there are those in the West who try on their behalf (CAIR, e.g.).
I am not convinced that 5% is impotent against an undermotivated 95%, and I believe that is what we face for the foreseeable future.
Your analysis is correct that headline fatigue and revulsion work against the Islamists in the majority, but Al'Qaeda is not necessarily playing to the majority. Zawahiri expressly states that the goal of the "propaganda by deed" is to reach a mere 5% of the Muslim youth. Comparing this objective to reality seems to indicate that Zawahiri is succeeding in what he and Osama set out to do.
Whether 5% is sufficient and whether propaganda by deed is a good strategy are valid questions and deserve a systematic inquiry. Nevertheless, one might concede your analysis of Al'Qaeda's informational weakness and still hold the opinion that they will not be determinative in Al'Qaeda's defeat.
The underlying problem, for which we have relatively few answers, is the increasing self-identification of young men according to their Muslimness, and the corollary universalization of grievances as Muslim grievances. This phenomenon is most prevalent in young Muslim men who have some level of interaction with the West (see Sayed Qutb's rejection of the West after his visit to America). This interaction heightens their awareness of global status (comparative failure), which then reinforces the jihadi imperative.
5%, linked and reinforced through the internet, is a formidable force. Al'Qaeda's influence overall may wax and wane with the media cycle, but the resolve of this group will not.
Which means the arm of decision is predominantly a Western arm. The danger is an admixture of Al'Qaeda's propaganda by deed with the feeling of Western guilt propagated by a cannabalistic media. Our narcissism is unusual in that, while we cannot pull ourselves away from the looking glass, it is a self-immolating fascination with abomination that keeps us rooted. Such self-disgust and guilt, which are reinforced by a media and academia that trade in it, are the only factors that can create the necessary environment for Western defeat. We may be periodically disturbed from our trance, through rioting or the occasional attack, and we may lash out in annoyance, but pulling ourselves away from our self-obsession for any length of time is now almost impossible. How long before the roots take hold permanently? How long before our guilt--and the timid intertia it causes--transitions into decline?
Islamist terror is but one manifestation of rejectionist ideology--the most obvious and most visible (and therefore the least problematic). The real danger comes from within. To withstand the viral assaults on our society that will inevitably come, we need to be bolstered by self-confidence and purpose. Unfortunately, these are the virtues that are slowly being stripped away by our elite.
The cause in fact of a potential decline will be our academia, but the proximate cause will be an irresponsible and undiscerning media. Therefore, the media is a clear and present danger and must be engaged.
[Den Beste responded that 5% is an impotent mass]
Your points are well taken: that 5% cannot succeed against a motivated 95%, and that headline fatigue causes a flight to the macabre which then attrits the support of the fellow-traveler--a support necessary for a robust terrorist movement.
We should then fear not the macabre, but acts of ostensible revolution couched in language sure to hypnotize a vast segment of the disaffected, Marxist Left (riots in France, perhaps?). Islamists might not be nimble enough to manage this, though there are those in the West who try on their behalf (CAIR, e.g.).
I am not convinced that 5% is impotent against an undermotivated 95%, and I believe that is what we face for the foreseeable future.
posted by John Aristides at 3:20 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home