Wherefore Restraint?
rwe: "The only solution I have come up with is massive camps in remote desert areas in which we would incarcerate as many people as would be required to solve the problem. If that is 95% of the Sunni population of Iraq, then so be it."
I've thought about it long and hard, and I have no good answers. The Leftist dodge of more troops on the ground and "no plan" rings true in some parts, but not in the way they mean it. Our biggest strategic mistake was going to the UN for a year, giving Saddam and Al'Qaeda time to plan the insurgency.
More troops on the border I can see, and I have to think it would have helped. But more troops in the cities would have been madness. Giant "reeducation camps" make sense to me, but in the end I think Iraq is going to have to work out its own problems in that respect.
The restraint I referred to is our response to the pressure of the anti-war camps. The banshee shriek from the Left when the US exercised her might clouded the good judgment of the Administration, and at a time when momentum was clearly on our side. The case against Syria should be made publically, forcefully, and often, and if Assad doesn't change his ways, swift punitive action should be visited upon his head. Let the Syrians worry about their next regime. All I care about is the decapitation of a government so willfully fighting against us. You can bet the next Syrian administration would walk a little lighter around us.
But, on the other hand, perhaps we are building up Iraq's army and collecting incontrovertible data so that Iraq will make the case for retribution.
All I know is that lately we have used the velvet glove but have forgotten to include the iron fist. As Wretchard says, it seems like we are hoping time is on our side.
I've thought about it long and hard, and I have no good answers. The Leftist dodge of more troops on the ground and "no plan" rings true in some parts, but not in the way they mean it. Our biggest strategic mistake was going to the UN for a year, giving Saddam and Al'Qaeda time to plan the insurgency.
More troops on the border I can see, and I have to think it would have helped. But more troops in the cities would have been madness. Giant "reeducation camps" make sense to me, but in the end I think Iraq is going to have to work out its own problems in that respect.
The restraint I referred to is our response to the pressure of the anti-war camps. The banshee shriek from the Left when the US exercised her might clouded the good judgment of the Administration, and at a time when momentum was clearly on our side. The case against Syria should be made publically, forcefully, and often, and if Assad doesn't change his ways, swift punitive action should be visited upon his head. Let the Syrians worry about their next regime. All I care about is the decapitation of a government so willfully fighting against us. You can bet the next Syrian administration would walk a little lighter around us.
But, on the other hand, perhaps we are building up Iraq's army and collecting incontrovertible data so that Iraq will make the case for retribution.
All I know is that lately we have used the velvet glove but have forgotten to include the iron fist. As Wretchard says, it seems like we are hoping time is on our side.
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